A guide to cap tables, according to Temidayo Oniosun
Angel investing is hard and inherently risky. Unlike venture capital firms, angels do not often have the resources to perform deep due diligence and sometimes invest intuitively, but one leveller is the startup’s cap table. A cap table is the single source of truth for who owns shares in a startup, under what terms, and how proceeds will be distributed in future financings or exits. It’s often the final due diligence step that an investor takes before wiring money. As an angel, you often do not own enough equity to dictate the structure, but you should read the cap tables before wiring money, revisit it with every proposed round, and model what it looks like after your cheque converts to protect your investment. While most angels do not have board seats, they can negotiate for information rights, pro-rata follow-on rights, or, in some extreme cases, even vetoes on key decisions. These terms give you visibility and leverage, two things that can make all the difference in a future negotiation or liquidity event. For this week’s Ask an Investor, I spoke to Temidayo Oniosun, the CEO of Space in Africa and an angel investor in forty startups, about how angel investors should think about cap tables. His investment portfolio includes active startups like MoneyHash, WeMove, Touch and Pay, and Eden Life, and shuttered startups like Dash and Zazuu. Like most Nigerian angel investors, the successes of Paystack and Flutterwave drew him to investing in African startups. “Startup investing became a hot topic. I had some excess capital, so I thought, ‘Why not?’ he said. Since he started investing in 2021, he has mostly used two approaches. “First, there are startups I come across directly. Either I reach out to the founder after seeing what they’re building, or they pitch me. If we have a good conversation and I believe in what they’re doing, I write a cheque,” he said. That approach brought startups like WeMove and Zedvance Africa to his portfolio. The other approach is through an angel syndicate, a group of angel investors that pool capital into startups. Through this syndicate, he has invested in over 20 startups. His experience as a founder and investor has allowed him to develop some strong opinions on cap tables. Our conversation serves as a guide to angel investors and founders on how to structure cap tables at the earliest stages of the startup process. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. How do you define a healthy cap table at the seed stage? What should it typically look like? What constitutes a healthy cap table has changed over the past five years, given the different waves we’ve seen in startup fundraising. To be honest, I haven’t written any new cheques yet this year so I can’t say for sure if the dynamics have changed again. But generally, at the seed stage, I expect to see some level of structure in place. It’s different from the pre-seed stage where there’s often little to no structure. At seed, the company should have matured a bit. I expect the founders to still own a significant majority of the business. It’s too early to be giving away large chunks of equity. There should also be signs that the founders are still fully committed to what they’re building. What exactly do you mean by structure and, percentage-wise, what qualifies as a founder still owning a good share of the company? 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Read MoreCharacterisation and digital maturity assessment of MSMEs in Nigeria by GIZ/digital transformation center Nigeria
As part of ongoing efforts to strengthen Nigeria’s innovation ecosystem, the European Union and the German Government, through GIZ’s Digital Transformation Center Nigeria (DTC Nigeria), commissioned a landmark study on the Characterisation and Digital Maturity Assessment of MSMEs in Nigeria. The research was conducted by Apodissi Ltd across ten Nigerian states namely Abia, Abuja, Benue, Enugu, Kano, Lagos, Niger, Ondo, Rivers, and Sokoto targeting 1,811 MSMEs in three key sectors: Green Economy (green energy, recycling, and agriculture), Manufacturing, and Trading. The study generated data-driven insights on the digital maturity of MSMEs, exploring their current use of digital tools, attitudes toward digitalization, and the demographic, geographic, and sectoral variables influencing digital uptake. From the report, the acute challenges facing MSMEs include inflation, rising operational costs, lack of power, limited access to finance, and high equipment costs. For instance, 72% of respondents cited increasing costs (raw materials, logistics, energy) as their biggest hurdle, while 59% mentioned inflation and 36% noted the prohibitive cost of equipment. Despite these challenges, there is a widespread belief in the potential of innovation and technology to enable growth. The most commonly used digital tools included mobile applications (84%), SMS (75%), USSD codes (65%), email (60%), and internet services (53%). The research also classified MSMEs into three digital maturity personas based on their knowledge, usage, and attitudes toward digital technology: Reinventors (61%) – actively leveraging digital tools to transform their businesses Adaptors (27%) – open to digitalisation but need support Sceptics (12%) – cautious or hesitant toward digital adoption This research provides a crucial evidence base for supporting Nigeria’s MSMEs to unlock the benefits of digital transformation. For full insights, read the complete report here https://tinyurl.com/GIZDTCNigeria
Read MoreInside CWG’s quiet rise: How a legacy hardware vendor built a ₦46 billion IT engine
This is Follow the Money, our weekly series that unpacks the earnings, business, and scaling strategies of African tech, fintechs, e-commerce, telcos, and financial institutions. A new edition drops every Monday. CWG Plc, short for Computer Warehouse Group, is quietly becoming one of Nigeria’s most profitable technology companies. Founded in 1992 and listed on the Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX) in 2013, the former hardware reseller has transformed into a full-stack IT company serving banks, telcos, and governments across Africa. In 2024, CWG doubled revenue and quadrupled profit, without a cent of venture funding. The company posted its strongest financial results in 2024, with revenue hitting ₦46.4 billion ($29.3 million)—up 97% from ₦23.5 billion in 2023. Pre-tax profit rose 290% to ₦4.42 billion ($2.8 million), while after-tax profit jumped 428% to ₦3.04 billion ($1.9 million). “This growth resulted from increased sales and our strategic focus on enhancing efficiency, optimising costs, disciplined management of operating expenses, and boosting productivity,” said Adewale Adeyipo, Group CEO, in the company’s 2024 annual report. That momentum has continued into 2025. In Q1, CWG reported ₦1.48 billion ($921,000) in after-tax profit—a 368% increase from ₦316.1 million ($196,700) in Q1 2024. Quarterly revenue rose 83% year-on-year to ₦15.3 billion ($9.5 million). So, how exactly does CWG make its moneyand what is powering this dramatic financial turnaround? From hardware to software—and profitability For most of its history, CWG was best known as a systems integrator selling Oracle hardware across sub-Saharan Africa. But as Nigeria’s digital economy matured, the company bet big on software and enterprise services. That bet is now paying off. In 2024, software became CWG’s biggest revenue driver, contributing ₦16.4 billion ($10.3 million)—35.3% of total revenue. Much of this was driven by CWG’s long-term partnership with Indian multinational financial company Infosys, through which it distributes the Finacle core banking application to top Nigerian banks, including First Bank, GTBank, UBA, Fidelity, Stanbic IBTC, FCMB, and Wema, which did major software upgrades last year. GTCO, which migrated to Finacle in late 2024, cited improved scalability and innovation as key drivers. A core banking expert who asked not to be named said tier-1 Nigerian banks typically spend at least $10 million annually on core banking software. Beyond distribution, CWG’s proprietary platforms are gaining traction. SMERP, a cloud-based business tool for SMEs, grew revenue by 1,000% in 2024. KuleanPay, an escrow platform, saw a 2,000% spike in transaction volumes, while UCP, CWG’s cooperative management platform, processed 500 million transactions—up 50% year-on-year. Finedge, its digital financial services arm, onboarded nearly 20 financial institutions in 2024. Managed support services: A stable revenue engine CWG’s managed support services business, which includes IT outsourcing, maintenance, and business process support, brought in ₦14.6 billion ($9.2 million) last year—about 31% of revenue. These long-term contracts offer stable income and low churn, especially with banks and telcos that outsource mission-critical systems to CWG. Though not as high-margin as software, managed services are sticky. Once a bank outsources its IT infrastructure, switching vendors becomes difficult and expensive, making this segment a retention moat for CWG. Hardware infrastructure: Essential but less profitable CWG’s hardware business generated ₦12.8 billion ($8.1 million) in 2024—roughly 28% of revenue. This includes the sale of servers, network equipment, PoS terminals, and data center gear to clients like MTN and Etisalat. Hardware remains crucial, but it’s a tough business in Nigeria, where naira depreciation drives up import costs and squeezes margins. CWG continues to service this segment to maintain relationships, but its focus is clearly shifting to higher-margin offerings. Building in fintech infrastructure CWG also runs a smaller but fast-growing fintech infrastructure arm. Unlike consumer-facing players like Flutterwave or OPay, CWG builds backend infrastructure for banks, utility companies, and governments. In 2024, its platform services segment contributed ₦2.18 billion ($1.4 million)—about 4.5% of revenue. Flagship products include BillsnPay, a utility bill aggregator that processed ₦18.6 billion ($11.6 million) in transaction value across 30.5 million payments last year. The company’s infrastructure-as-a-service tools support transaction routing, card issuance, and backend automation for traditional banks and fintechs alike. “CWG is a long-established and reputable technology company, evidenced by its use by 60% of Nigerian banks, including major institutions,” said Kassy Olisakwe, head of blockchain development at Ubuntu Tribe and an investor in the company. He added that while CWG’s services are premium-priced, “they offer comprehensive solutions encompassing software, infrastructure, IT support, and a highly regarded ATM service.” Regional growth in Ghana and Uganda CWG’s success in 2024 wasn’t confined to Nigeria, which contributed over ₦30 billion ($18.8 million) to the total revenue. Its subsidiaries in Ghana and Uganda delivered breakout performances, contributing ₦8.44 billion ($5.3 million) and ₦7.34 billion ($4.6 million) respectively. Both markets more than doubled their 2023 revenue numbers. “The spike in technology consumption across West Africa drove improved performance at CWG Ghana, with a recorded revenue of over $6.4 million,” Adeyipo said. He added that CWG Uganda showed positive growth in all indices, achieving a total revenue of $5.89 million. These results affirm CWG’s regional diversification strategy, which plans to expand to new markets in East Africa and the Middle East this year. While Nigeria remains its largest market, the ability to replicate its enterprise solutions model in other African countries creates new growth avenues and reduces single-market risk. Credit sales raise red flags But there are warning signs. CWG’s trade receivables—sales made on credit—rose 44% to ₦16.8 billion ($10.5 million) in 2024, raising concerns about delayed payments. At the same time, payables rose 47% to ₦15.3 billion ($9.6 million), meaning CWG is also stretching payments to its suppliers. This kind of working capital juggling is common in Nigeria, but if clients default or delay payments, CWG’s cash flow could come under pressure. Dividend doubles, shareholder confidence grows Despite risks, CWG ended the year on a strong note as total assets jumped 68% to ₦29.9 billion ($18.3 million), and shareholders’ equity nearly tripled to ₦6.63 billion ($4.2 million). The company rewarded shareholders with a final dividend of 39 kobo per share—more than double the 16
Read MoreSolar dominates Africa’s energy investments, but millions remain in the dark
This article was originally published on TechCabal Insights and was written by Adedayo Ojo, Associate Consultant – TechCabal Insights. Africa stands at a pivotal moment in its energy future. The continent is experiencing an unprecedented surge in renewable energy investment, rising from $2.6 billion in 2021 to an estimated $40 billion in 2024. Yet, Africa’s renewable energy investments represent under 3% of global clean-energy flows, despite housing 19-20% of the world’s population and immense renewable potential. This leaves Africa with an annual clean energy investment gap of approximately $60 billion, based on 2024 flows ($40 billion) compared to the $100 billion needed annually to meet the continent’s 300 GW target by 2030. This surge in investments has enabled the development of impressive megaprojects across the continent: Morocco’s 580 MW Noor solar plant spanning 3,500 football fields in the Sahara; Kenya’s 310 MW Lake Turkana wind farm generating 17% of the country’s installed capacity; and Egypt’s massive 1.8 GW Benban solar park with 41 solar plants across 37 square kilometers of desert. Despite this influx, investment inefficiencies remain a challenge. Bureaucratic delays and grid constraints often slow project execution, with some developments facing 12–18-month regulatory setbacks before reaching implementation. Solar dominates Africa’s renewable energy investments in 2024 Africa’s renewable energy investment landscape in 2024 reveals a significant imbalance in technology allocation. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Investment 2024 report and IRENA’s Renewable Energy Transition in Africa study, Solar PV dominates with 62% of total renewable funding, split between utility-scale (40%) and distributed (22%) installations. Wind energy receives just 16% of investment despite the continent’s abundant wind resources, while bioenergy (12%) and small hydro (10%) complete the portfolio. The overwhelming concentration on solar, while leveraging Africa’s strong solar irradiation, masks critical gaps in the continent’s renewable diversification strategy. Beyond institutional investments, private equity and venture-backed renewables are emerging as critical drivers of Africa’s energy transition. The continent’s private equity market is projected to reach $900 million in 2025, with investors prioritising solar and wind startups using innovative financing models, such as blended finance and risk-sharing mechanisms. The persistent energy access gap The investment surge stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of hundreds of millions of Africans. Over 600 million people across Africa, roughly 43% of the continent’s population, still lack access to electricity. For those who do have grid connections, reliability remains a persistent challenge. Power outages and load shedding are commonplace across many African countries, with businesses and households often experiencing daily disruptions lasting hours. The economic impact is substantial. One study finds that failing utilities and outages can cost national economies up to 4% of GDP annually. This stark disconnect between growing investment and persistent energy poverty raises critical questions about the nature and direction of Africa’s energy transition. ALSO READ: Africa’s climate tech sector needs winners to justify recent funding jump Jobs and growth potential This is a huge missed opportunity. Investment in renewables creates roughly three times more jobs per dollar than the same spending on fossil fuels. If Africa scaled up clean energy, models suggest that on the order of 14 million jobs 2030 could be added in the sector. Under current investment trends, however, that job creation growth opportunity risks slipping away as millions of potential green jobs could simply never materialise. Climate vulnerability Africa also sits at the front lines of climate risk. Many of the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries are in Africa, so delays in deploying clean power compound the problem. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) projects that adaptation costs alone could hit $50 billion per year by 2050 even under a 2 °C warming scenario. In other words, underinvesting in clean energy now means a far steeper “climate tax” on African economies later. Conclusion As Africa continues to attract record levels of renewable energy investment, the challenge lies in ensuring that the growing capital flows translate into meaningful energy access for the hundreds of millions still lacking basic electricity services, while the true measure of success will not be found in headline investment figures or megawatt additions alone. It will be measured in homes illuminated, businesses empowered, improvements in healthcare services, and economic opportunities created. For Africa to fully realise its renewable energy potential, investment must not only increase in volume but also diversify in both technology mix and geographic distribution. Only then can the continent transform its energy paradox into an equitable and sustainable energy future. Explore our dashboard: Track African exits and acquisitions in energy and other related sectors.
Read MoreHow Nigerians lost nearly ₦8 billion trying to enter Europe in 2024; the cost wasn’t just financial
In January 2024, Adeyemi Anifowose, a Lagos-based web designer and cybersecurity professional, applied for a Schengen visa after securing admission to a master’s programme in Luxembourg. He had ₦30 million (about €30,211 and $46,512 at the time) in his savings account and submitted all the necessary documents—from police clearance to travel insurance. But his application was rejected. The reason? A second naira devaluation at the end of January eroded the euro value of his savings, bringing his proof of funds to €16,700, a little short of the required €17,000. “I spent nearly ₦2 million ($1,257) on the process,” Anifowose told TechCabal. “I tried again this year but had to stop because the cost kept rising.” He is one of 50,376 Nigerians whose Schengen visa applications were denied in 2024, collectively losing over €4.5 million ($5.1 million) in non-refundable visa fees. That’s nearly ₦8 billion gone—without boarding a flight. Nigeria’s rising rejection rates According to the latest data from the European Commission, the rejection rate for Nigerian applicants reached 45.9% in 2024, up from 40.5% in 2023. It’s the highest rejection rate on record for Nigeria. This trend isn’t unique to Nigeria. Across Africa, applicants forfeited a staggering €60 million ($67.5 million) in visa fees to European consulates last year—fees that are never returned, even when a visa is denied. The growing cost of denial The Schengen visa allows entry into 29 European countries for up to 90 days. In 2024, 111,201 Nigerians applied, up from 105,926 in 2023. But only 60,825 applications were approved. Each application now costs €90, up from €80 in 2023, and the fee is non-refundable, regardless of the outcome. That means European consulates earned roughly €10 million ($11.3 million) from Nigerian applicants alone—a 14% increase from the previous year. But the financial impact goes beyond application fees. Many Nigerians spend months preparing, pay third-party agents, and sometimes lose deposits on flights or hotels booked in anticipation of approval. For many middle-class applicants, a rejection is more than a setback—it’s a financial and emotional blow. “My colleague and I submitted everything—employment letters, salary history, hotel reservations, an invitation from a tech conference in the Netherlands,” said a Nigerian tech marketing executive at a major fintech firm who asked to remain unnamed to speak freely. “Still, we were rejected. The embassy said they couldn’t ascertain why we were going.” Why rejection rates are rising According to Schengen.News, a European visa-focused information portal, the spike in rejections stems from stricter enforcement of immigration rules: “Schengen countries are more rigorously applying policy—thorough checks are leading to more rejections when documentation is incomplete, inconsistent, or raises concerns about overstays.” But even applicants who follow all the rules can still be denied entry. “I had to go back and forth submitting documents when I applied for my master’s in Spain in 2017,” said Babatunde Akin-Moses, CEO of fintech firm Sycamore. “It was a rigorous process, even though I was accepted.” What visa officers look out for Yinka Folami, national president of the National Association of Nigerian Travel Agencies (NANTA), says that while many Nigerians are technically eligible for visas, they often fall into the hands of deceitful agents promising guaranteed approvals. “Rather than relying on shortcuts, we should focus on sensitising the Nigerian travelling public—especially small business owners—on proper visa application procedures,” Folami said. According to him, applicants don’t need to be wealthy to qualify. What matters more is financial transparency and clear evidence of strong ties to Nigeria, through family, employment, or business activity. “If your business income isn’t reflected in your bank account, it’s hard to prove you’re running a real business,” he explained. “But if they see regular inflow and outflow, that shows active economic activity.” NANTA has also stressed that credibility—through proper documentation, consistent financial records, and truthful declarations—is more important than net worth. Global disparities in access In 2024, Nigeria ranked among the top 25 countries globally for Schengen visa applications and among the highest for rejections. It had the second-highest number of visa denials in Africa, rising two places from 2023. That stands in stark contrast to wealthier countries like China, the United Kingdom, and the US, where rejection rates are often below 10%. Some researchers see this growing imbalance as a form of “reverse remittance”. “Money is flowing from poor to rich countries,” Marta Foresti, founder of global social enterprise LAGO Collective, wrote in a recent blog for Africa at LSE. “Rejected visa applicants often pay more than the base fee—using brokers or agencies, and losing money on travel plans.” She added: “The costs of being denied—whether missing an academic conference, business event, or concert—are invisible but significant.” Europe tightens borders—digitally and legally As access tightens, new regulations are being rolled out to further restrict and digitise entry into Europe. In October 2025, the European Union (EU) will launch the Entry/Exit System (EES), which will automate border checks for non-EU citizens by collecting biometric data. By the end of 2026, travellers from visa-exempt countries will need pre-travel clearance under the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). Germany is also abolishing its informal remonstration system by July 2025. Previously, rejected applicants could appeal denials directly at German embassies. This change means fewer options for recourse. In Spain, authorities scrapped the Golden Visa programme in April 2025, which had allowed wealthy foreigners to gain residency by investing in real estate. The move is intended to curb speculative housing investments that drive up property prices for locals. While the geographical reach of Schengen expanded in January 2025 with Romania and Bulgaria joining the zone, the regulatory barriers to entry are growing in parallel. Even low-risk applicants face hurdles South Africa, with a relatively low rejection rate of 5.7%, appears to be faring better. But access is still not guaranteed. South African journalist Tracy Dube shared that her application to attend the Berlin energy transition dialogue in Germany last year was denied. “The reason given was that I would be a threat to public diplomacy,” she said.
Read MoreFrom ₦1 to ₦9,477 per metre: What each Nigerian state charges for broadband right-of-way
As Nigeria races toward its goal of achieving 70% broadband penetration and extending coverage to 90% of its population by the end of 2025, it faces a long-standing barrier: conflicting government jurisdictions over Right-of-Way (RoW), a legal framework that permits telecom providers to lay fibre cables in public spaces in the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Despite RoW being a key enabler of broadband infrastructure and a critical linchpin in Nigeria’s digital future, its inconsistent fees and overlapping agency jurisdiction across the states have made internet rollout slower, more expensive, and inequitable. For everyday users, it means unreliable internet connections, high data costs, and a digital divide that leaves some regions behind. While the federal government, through the National Economic Council (NEC), recommended a benchmark RoW fee at ₦145 per linear metre in 2013 to streamline broadband expansion, among other efforts, many Nigerian states have gone on to implement varying RoW charges, many with high costs, indicating noncompliance. This situation places Nigeria among African countries with low broadband penetration in proportion to its 142 million internet users. While Nigeria has only achieved 78,676km deployed fibre, its penetration stood at 45.4%, indicating more than half of its population remains offline. Other African countries have advanced more decisively in expanding broadband access by eliminating, subsidising, and harmonising their RoW fees. Nigeria is deploying an additional 90,000km to meet its target of 125,000km of fibre deployment by Q4 2025. Here is what each Nigerian state contributes to the country’s fibre deployments and their Right-of-Way charges. Lagos State Lagos State, renowned as Nigeria’s commercial hub, leads the country in internet connectivity, boosting 18.8 million internet users. The state has the highest internet penetration with deployed fibre cables of approximately 7,864km, and is ranked the third most expensive state with RoW charge, charging ₦6,264 per metre. It uses RoW as an important revenue-generating source. Edo State Edo State, with 5.9 million internet users, ranked second in the highest fibre cable deployment, deploying approximately 4,893km of fibre. The state officially charges ₦3,491 per metre for RoW, but has waived fees for key operators like MTN and Airtel under the immediate past administration led by Godwin Obaseki. This selective waiver aims to fast-track broadband infrastructure, especially for education and public institutions. It has invested in a few tech initiatives, including Edo Tech Park and the Edo Innovates Hub. Federal Capital Territory (FCT)–Abuja Abuja has RoW better than many states, charging ₦850 per metre for laying fibre in the capital. It has only achieved 4,472km of fibre deployed despite having 7,808,784 internet users. Oyo State Oyo State also imposes higher RoW fees at ₦5,303 per metre, significantly above the federal benchmark and has 4,329km deployed fibre in the state. It contributed 8.23 million internet users and was part of the Oodua Infraco Resources Limited project coverage to lay 1,031.44km fibre cable across the region. However, the high charge poses a barrier to expanding broadband deployment by telecom providers. Ogun State Ogun State leads with the highest RoW charge rate in the country at ₦9,477 per metre. With 9.5 internet subscribers, the state has recorded 4,189km fibre deployment. Ogun’s high RoW cost deters wider fibre expansion as it has raised concerns among Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and broadband investors. Niger State Niger State has waived Right-of-Way (RoW) fees for telecom operators, but introduced a one-time, non-refundable application fee of ₦500,000. This policy aims to attract private sector investment and expand internet access across the state. It has deployed 3,682km fibre cable and has 5.7 million internet users. Kaduna State Kaduna State was one of the earliest adopters of the federal recommendation, and waived its RoW fees to accelerate fibre deployment. It has laid 3,028km fibre cable, accounting for low broadband rollout to meet its 7.3 million internet users. It is also listed among the 19 states in the federal government’s fibre deployment project. Delta State Delta State adopted the federal benchmark for RoW charges at ₦145 per metre. This prompt fibre deployment in a state with approximately 2,750.42km, and favourable in terms of broadband infrastructure. The state has a higher number of online subscribers of 6 million.. Kano State Kano State’s Right-of-Way (RoW) fee stands at ₦2,258 per linear metre, surpassing the federal recommended charge. This cost poses challenges for telecom companies aiming to expand broadband services in the state. The state with the largest internet users of 9 million, has just 2,697km fibre cable deployed. Kogi State Kogi State’s Right-of-Way (RoW) fee is set at ₦2,000 per linear metre, also exceeding the federal benchmark. It has approximately 2,602km of fibre cable deployed, recording 3.6 million internet users. It launched the project connectivity to enhance internet access across its local government areas. Benue State Benue State charges ₦2,500 per linear metre for Right-of-Way permit, below the market average but exceeds the federal benchmark of ₦145. It currently has 4.4 million internet users and has laid 2,375km fibre cable. Aligning RoW charges with federal recommendations may encourage telecom operators to invest in the state’s digital infrastructure, enhancing internet accessibility and economic development. Ondo State Ondo State is a model for broadband-friendly policy, charging ₦145 per metre for RoW in line with federal recommendations, and it is also among the Oodua Infraco project coverage. It has 3.7 million internet users and has laid 2,302km fibre cable. Through its State Information Technology Agency (SITA), Ondo enforces the ‘One Dig Policy,’ which encourages coordinated fibre laying and infrastructure sharing. This approach reduces costs and disruption while boosting internet access. It is also implementing a Metro Fibre Network across the state to enhance ICT infrastructure. Bauchi State Bauchi State is among the 12 states that have waived their RoW charge. Its elimination of RoW fee is to attract telecom investment and facilitate broadband rollout to enhance digital connectivity in the state. The state is also among the 19 northern states that benefited from the federal government’s fibre deployment project. It has 2,018 km of fibre and accounts for 3.5 million internet users.
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Next Wave: Why Africa’s tech dream is political
Cet article est aussi disponible en français <!– In partnership with –> <!–TopBanner Join us for TechCabal Battlefield, Moonshot’s startup competition where you can showcase your startup idea to a global audience and an esteemed panel of judges and stand a chance to win up to 2.5 million naira in funding for your business! Click to register for TC Battlefield First published 25 May, 2025 Why Africa’s tech dream is political Image | CTECH Let me tell you the truth that we don’t say enough in Africa’s tech circles: If you’re building the next unicorn and ignoring politics, you’re playing with house money in a burning casino. I’ve spent the past two years of my journalism career listening to Africa’s startup stories. I’ve heard pitch after pitch at tech conferences from Nairobi to Lagos, Cape Town to Kampala about the continent’s untapped potential. I’ve talked to founders building payment solutions, edtech platforms, and e-commerce ideas. I’ve met investors who believe that Africa is the next frontier for venture capital, especially in climatech, agritech, fintech, and e-commerce. But there’s a sentence I rarely hear in these circles, which should be on every slide deck and in every boardroom: “We need government to work to make this a reality.” And now I’m convinced that billion-dollar valuations, oversubscribed rounds, and the gospel of venture capital seduce us. I understand the silence. Politics is messy. In some parts of Africa, it’s dangerous. But after years of reporting on this space, I’m certain the so-called “African digital revolution” will stall unless founders and investors stop ignoring governance and start engaging with it. You can’t build the future on a broken foundation—and right now, too many of us are pretending we can. Next Wave continues after this ad. Moonshot is back, and this year, it’s about moving from resilience to results. With the theme Building Momentum, the 2025 edition explores how Africa’s digital economy can shift gears into scale, structure, and long-term growth. Expect more honest reflections, sharper insights, closed-door roundtables, and conversations that don’t end when the panels do. Watch the 2024 highlights. Early bird discount now available Reserve your spot here! Apolitical innovation? There’s a comforting myth that tech can rise above politics. That we can engineer solutions around our messy governments with enough capital, code, and cleverness. But the longer I’ve been in this space, the clearer it’s become: Africa has no apolitical innovation. And I’ve seen this fantasy play out countless times: a founder claims they’re building a groundbreaking B2C e-commerce platform or an agritech that connects farmers to cutting-edge soil testing technology. But when you dig deeper, you realise the core assumptions—about logistics, connectivity, electricity, and regulation—don’t hold up to the reality on the ground. Let’s look at some numbers: 1. In Nigeria, 85 million people (about 43% of the population) have no access to grid electricity. Power outages cost the economy an estimated $29 billion annually. Try running a data centre—or a cold chain logistics company—in that environment. Frequent outages force most startups to rely on diesel generators, eating up 30-40% of operational budgets for data centres and fintechs. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, just 19% of people have access to electricity, according to the World Bank. 2. Intra-African trade is just 15.9% of the continent’s total exports (UNCTAD, 2023). For comparison, intra-EU trade is about 68.2%. Why? Bureaucratic borders, poor transport infrastructure, and conflicting customs regulations—all political failures. 3. The World Bank’s “Doing Business” indicators (before they were discontinued in 2021) consistently placed African countries at the bottom for ease of starting a business, enforcing contracts, and accessing credit. These are not tech problems. They’re governance problems. 4. Meanwhile, internet penetration across Africa is just 43%, and the average cost of 1GB of mobile data in sub-Saharan Africa is 5x higher than in South Asia. Spectrum pricing, telecom taxes, and monopolistic policy frameworks are at the heart of this disparity. 5. The African Development Bank estimates the continent needs $170 billion a year in infrastructure investment—roads, ports, power, and digital connectivity. The current shortfall? Around $100 billion annually. 6. In Ghana, the cost of borrowing for public infrastructure remains as high as 25% due to weak credit ratings and poor fiscal policies. Next Wave continues after this ad. Nigeria’s digital payment space is evolving fast. Are you keeping up? Our latest report highlights key shifts, challenges, and opportunities across the country’s payments ecosystem. Donwload the report now. What does this mean for startups? You can’t scale a logistics company without roads. You can’t host AI models in a country without stable power. You can’t deploy nationwide edtech if half your students are offline or paying $5 for 1GB of data. These are not nice-to-haves. They are the rails on which a digital economy runs. Every dream of disruption in Africa—whether in health, finance, mobility, or manufacturing—is bottlenecked by the exact root cause: systemic corruption and underinvestment in public goods. And public goods are political. Founders are political actors, whether they admit or not Every time a founder negotiates a license, secures a tax break, or lobbies for regulatory clarity, they engage with politics. Yet too many behave like politics is a dirty word—best avoided at dinner parties, pitch decks, and board meetings. But the truth? We’re already in it. And the longer we pretend we’re not, the less prepared we are to shape the systems that shape us. Look at China. You can’t write its growth story without the government. From constructing world-class ports to rolling out 5G infrastructure, Beijing has been a strategic co-architect of its tech ecosystem. The same goes for the US—Silicon Valley didn’t just explode out of libertarian magic. It was boosted with public R&D dollars, government contracts, and policy decisions that created the internet, GPS, and semiconductors. Next Wave continues after this ad. The Lagos Startup Expo returns on June 18–19, 2025, at Landmark Centre, Victoria Island, with the theme “Connect, Invest and Innovate.” This year’s edition will host over 200 startups
Read MoreIHS trims tower portfolio to 37,700 in strategic shift from smaller African markets
On Tuesday, May 20, 2025, IHS Holdings—Africa’s largest independent telecom tower operator—announced the sale of its Rwandan operations to Paradigm Tower Ventures for up to $274.5 million. Although the deal covers just 1,465 tower sites—less than 4% of IHS’s total portfolio—it marks a clear strategic pivot: the company is shifting away from smaller, lower-margin markets to focus on larger, high-growth African economies where scale offers stronger operational leverage and profitability. This move represents a departure from IHS’s earlier strategy: aggressive expansion and geographic diversification across emerging markets. In the past decade, the company has entered countries such as Rwanda, Kuwait, and Peru through acquisitions and build-to-suit agreements, to secure early-mover advantages and long-term tenancy contracts. That expansion drive helped position IHS as a global player ahead of its 2021 IPO, even though it meant operating in markets that often delivered lower returns or posed operational complexities. The Rwandan divestment follows similar exits from Kuwait and Peru in 2024, signaling a deliberate realignment of IHS’s global footprint. The company now prioritises markets with higher commercial potential and more favorable economics. CEO Sam Darwish described the Rwanda sale as “carefully considered” and part of a broader effort to drive shareholder value. The deal’s valuation—8.3 times adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA)—underscores continued investor confidence in African telecom infrastructure, even as the sector recalibrates for efficiency and scale. This transaction also simplifies IHS’s business model. Streamlining its portfolio allows the company to reduce operational complexity and allocate capital more efficiently. It also supports clearer financial reporting and enhances visibility for investors, key priorities as IHS continues to evolve post-IPO. IHS’s shift mirrors a broader trend across the African tower industry. Tower companies are increasingly retreating from smaller or operationally challenging markets in response to rising interest rates, currency volatility, and logistical constraints like unreliable electricity. Helios Towers, for instance, reduced its capital expenditure from $765 million in 2022 to a projected $170–210 million in 2023, focusing on core markets such as Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Oman. The company also paused planned acquisitions in Chad and Gabon due to regulatory hurdles, reflecting a more disciplined and selective expansion strategy. Despite Rwanda’s reputation as a politically stable, fast-digitising economy, its scale presented limitations for a player of IHS’s size. The 1,465 towers operated in Rwanda represented a small portion of IHS’s 39,212 sites as of Q1 2025. Post-sale, IHS’s portfolio will stand at approximately 37,747 towers—still far ahead of any independent towerco operating on the continent. The deal highlights a fundamental truth in the tower business: scale matters. Managing towers in smaller markets demands similar administrative, regulatory, and infrastructure oversight as larger ones—but without the same revenue potential. By concentrating on scale, IHS aims to improve margin efficiency, deepen market penetration, and better serve anchor tenants across its core geographies. These core markets are not only larger, more strategic. Nigeria accounts for over 16,000 towers, representing roughly 43% of IHS’s post-sale portfolio. IHS holds a 63% market share in Nigeria and is the sole independent tower operator in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zambia. In South Africa, it maintains a 37% market share and continues to invest in 4G densification and early-stage 5G deployments. The Rwandan divestment is also a play in capital discipline. Proceeds from the sale can be reinvested into infrastructure upgrades in high-value markets or used to reduce debt, strengthening IHS’s financial position and positioning it for future growth. As Darwish noted in the company’s Q1 2025 report, such moves are about “boosting the balance sheet” and realigning the portfolio to match evolving market opportunities. According to IHS Q1 2025 earnings, the Rwandan business remained part of its consolidated results during the quarter, with revenue from the sale to be recognised once the deal closes in H2 2025 Despite the sale, IHS remains the undisputed leader in Africa’s tower infrastructure landscape. With over 37,700 towers, its scale enables it to negotiate favorable tenancy agreements, reduce per-site costs, and attract long-term investment. IHS’s leaner, more focused structure positions it to capitalise on the next wave of infrastructure demand. The reduction in tower count, from 39,000 to 37,700, is less a contraction and more a strategic reorientation—designed to play smarter in a market where scale and focus increasingly trump size alone.
Read MoreWhy Kenya is selling part of its 34.9% stake in Safaricom
Kenya plans to offload an undisclosed portion of its 34.9% stake in Safaricom, the region’s most profitable company, as part of a privatisation push to raise $1.1 billion (KES149 billion) to plug a hole in public finances and avoid imposing new taxes amid a tough economy. The planned transaction, expected before the end of the 2025/26 fiscal year, would mark the government’s biggest divestiture in nearly two decades and a reversal of its previous reluctance to part with shares in the telecom giant. The sale could open doors to Africa-focused institutional investors or private equity funds, many actively scouting African telecoms assets for their stable cash flows and strong margins. “There is talk that if we could offload more of our ownership of Safaricom, where we are likely to get the Sh149 billion through privatisation in the 2025/26 financial year,” John Mbadi, Treasury Cabinet Secretary, told Business Daily. Safaricom, whose growth in recent years relied on its dominant mobile money platform M-Pesa and data services, posted an 11% rise in net profit to $540 million (KES 69.8 billion) in 2024, including returns from its Ethiopia subsidiary. It declared a total dividend of $0.009 (KES1.20) per share, delivering $130.5 million (KES16.8 billion) in earnings to the Kenyan government. Kenya last sold a 25% stake in Safaricom during its heavily oversubscribed 2008 IPO, raising $400.5 million (KES51.75 billion). The current stake is valued at $2.1 billion (KES280.5 billion) at the prevailing share price of $0.15 (KES19.9). While the Treasury has not revealed how to offload the stake, it could opt for a secondary public offering or an off-market block sale to private investors. Privatisation has long stalled in Kenya due to political meddling and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Since 2013, the Treasury’s attempts to divest from parastatals, including hotels, sugar companies, and airlines, have faltered, as losses and debts plague many of the firms targeted due to decades of mismanagement. With fewer financing options, rising debt repayments squeezing the budget, and a possible taxation revolt from Kenyans, the government has limited choices. The urgency behind the Safaricom stake sale is rooted in the country’s mounting debt costs. In the first eight months of the 2015/2016 financial year, Kenya spent $5.5 billion (KES 722 billion) on interest payments alone—more than half of the $10.8 billion (KES 1.4 trillion) it raised in tax revenue over the same period. Domestic debt was the biggest drain, consuming $4.3 billion (KES 565.8 billion), while $1.2 billion (KES 156.5 billion) went to external creditors. Currently, interest costs are on track to exceed $7.7 billion (KES 1 trillion) by year-end—a huge figure highlighting how much room debt repayments are taking up in the national budget. Kenya’s total public debt now stands at $88.5 billion (KES 11.4 trillion), up from $67.3 billion (KES 8.7 trillion) when President William Ruto took office less than three years ago. The rapid growth—$20.8 billion (KES 2.7 trillion) in under 36 months—has left the Treasury with few painless options. With tax revenues underperforming and little political appetite for more tax hikes, selling stakes in profitable state assets like Safaricom is now a fiscal necessity.
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👨🏿🚀TechCabal Daily – Twiga’s new glam
In partnership with Lire en Français اقرأ هذا باللغة العربية Happy salary week! Sadly, it’s the beginning of lengthy, boring weekends for football lovers across the globe. Both the English Premier League and the Italian football league came to a close yesterday. With more football leagues closing next weekend, the beautiful game is officially on vacation until August. But hey, that just means you’ve got more time to chase your own big goals, find new interesting hobbies and, of course, catch up on our weekend columns. ICYMI: Discover how MyFoodAngels thrived in its first 1,000 days, and follow Chioma Wilson-Dike’s inspiring legal-tech journey in last week’s Digital Nomads. – Faith Twiga is restructuring: 300 jobs out, new holding company in South Africa’s new ICT policy could finally clear a path for Starlink Nigeria’s proposed blockchain policy whitepaper will encourage collaboration Egypt cuts benchmark rates for the second time in a row World Wide Web 3 Events E-commerce Twiga is restructuring: 300 jobs out, new holding company in Image Source: Twiga Foods Twiga Foods is in its reinvention era, and it’s not joking about it! Project Easter: Twiga Foods, one of Kenya’s most funded B2B e-commerce startups that connect farmers and vendors, is currently pivoting to an asset-light operation model to cut costs. The move which has been favored by VCs allows the company to scale faster by leveraging existing distributor networks instead of owning expensive infrastructure. Dubbed ‘Project Easter’ (because, rebirth?) Twiga Foods has created a new holding company—referred to internally as “newco,”—to oversee logistics, procurement, and technology across the company and its subsidiaries. Whether Newco has been formally registered and if it would function as a holding company is yet to be disclosed. Only a small central crew of about 10–12 people will transfer into the mysterious newco. The company also had a round of job cuts. In an internal document seen by TechCabal, Twiga had 300 job cuts, with the supply chain department taking the hardest hit—267 roles gone. The restructuring continues a round of layoffs in the company, as in October 2022, the company laid off 211 people from its sales team. As part of the restructuring, Twiga acquired controlling shares in three Local FMCG distributors, Jumra, Sojoar, and Raisons, In April 2025. The acquisitions gave Twiga access to eight distribution centers across Kenya’s Central, Coastal, and Western regions. So… why the drama? Twiga insists these changes are about sustainability and profitability, but the need for a new holding structure suggests its previous model wasn’t built to manage a multi-entity operation. Twiga’s bet is that a sleeker and more centralised business structure will unify its operations and attract investors. But the drive for efficiency goes beyond just corporate reorganization. Twiga is also rethinking its physical presence, considering relocating from its Tatu City logistics hub to more affordable, centrally located sites closer to Nairobi. Altogether, these moves reflect Twiga’s broader shift toward growth after years of grappling with the challenge of digitizing food distribution from rural producers to urban resellers across Kenya. Join Fincra for an Exclusive Side Event at Money20/20 Europe Fincra is co-hosting “Stablecoins & The Future of Payments” at Money20/20 Europe with Utila, Rail, Wirex & more. Join fintech leaders for insightful panels & networking. Limited spots – RSVP here. 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